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The Limits of International Law
in Content Moderation
evelyn douek*
In remarkably short order, there has been growing convergence,
especially in academia and civil society, around the idea that major social
media platforms should use international human rights law (IHRL) as the
basis for their content moderation rules. Even platforms themselves have
begun to agree. But why have these legendarily growth-obsessed companies
been so quick to voluntarily say they are jumping on this bandwagon?
Afterall, advocates for incorporating IHRL into content moderation
governance generally envision it operating as a constraint on social media
platforms’ operations. There are both encouraging and less encouraging
explanations. For the glass half-full types, there is the straightforward
explanation that perhaps these companies genuinely care about human
rights. But there is also a less optimistic possibility: companies are embracing
the terminology so readily because they know that, in reality, it will not act
as much of a constraint at all. This is the prospect explored in this Article.
This Article is a sympathetic critique of the contributions IHRL can make
to content moderation, highlighting the very real limits of IHRL as a
practical guide to what platforms should do in many, if not most, difficult
cases. It surveys the many arguments in favor of IHRL as a basis for content
moderation rules. Ultimately, however, it argues that failing to acknowledge
the considerable limitations of IHRL in this context will only serve the
interests of platforms rather than their users by giving platforms undeserved
legitimacy dividends, allowing them to wrap themselves in the language of
IHRL even as what is required by that body of norms remains
indeterminate and contested.

* Lecturer on Law & S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School; Affiliate, Berkman Klein Center for
Internet & Society. Many thanks to Martha Minow, Jack Goldsmith, Susan Benesch, Sam Bookman,
Elena Chachko, Brenda Dvoskin, Barrie Sander, participants at the UC Irvine School of Law
Symposium on Transnational Legal Ordering of Privacy and Speech, and especially to David Kaye for
his tireless work in this field, inspiring leadership, and willingness to engage in good faith debate in the
best tradition of freedom of expression. Huge and sincere thanks, too, to Ally Myers, Amelia Haselkorn,
Sharon Baek, Jonathan Widjaja and all the student editors that shepherded this piece through the
production process; their careful attention to this article significantly improved it. Any limits on this
Article’s correctness remain my fault alone.
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INTRODUCTION
In remarkably short order, there has been growing convergence around the
idea that major social media platforms should use international human rights law
(IHRL) as the basis for their content moderation rules. The argument was
spearheaded by David Kaye during his tenure as U.N. special rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Kaye
made the first comprehensive case for the proposal in his mid-2018 report to the
U.N. Human Rights Council.1 The call has been increasingly echoed by academics
and civil society2 and, in a coup for the movement, platforms themselves have
1. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018); see also Evelyn Douek,
U.N. Special Rapporteur’s Latest Report on Online Content Regulation Calls for ‘Human Rights by Default’,
LAWFARE (June 6, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/un-special-rapporteurs-latestreport-online-content-regulation-calls-human-rights-default.
2. See, e.g., Barrie Sander, Freedom of Expression in the Age of Online Platforms: The Promise
and Pitfalls of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Content Moderation, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 939,
966–69 (2020); Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. &
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begun suggesting they do or will incorporate IHRL into their content moderation
governance systems.3
But why have these legendarily growth-obsessed companies been so quick to
voluntarily say they are jumping on this bandwagon when the advocates for this
approach generally envision it operating as a constraint on their operations? In the
realm of possible reasons, there are both encouraging and less encouraging answers.
For the glass-half-full types, there is the straightforward explanation that
perhaps these companies do genuinely care about human rights. If so, the notion
that platforms should look to IHRL in writing and enforcing the rules for what they
allow on their services has intuitive appeal. On a more practical level, the major tech
platforms are inherently international and generally insist on having a single global
set of content standards to the extent possible.4 Platforms’ rules have significant
ramifications for their users’ freedom of expression, privacy, equality, and many
other rights and interests that IHRL speaks to. IHRL is therefore a seemingly
obvious place to turn to for their global rules affecting rights.
Although IHRL is primarily addressed to states, the Human Rights Council
adopted the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(UNGPs) in 2011, which provide a framework (albeit non-binding) of expected
conduct for private actors with respect to human rights.5 The UNGPs describe a
“three-pillar framework” to (1) protect and (2) respect human rights, and (3) remedy
any abuses as a result of business-related activities.6 This Article focuses on the
second pillar—the corporate responsibility to “respect” human rights—because it
is through constructing content moderation systems incorporating IHRL that
platforms can articulate respect for human rights in the course of determining
exactly what IHRL would require in any context. Of course, this merges with the

TECH. REV. 26, 67 (2018); Jillian C. York & Corynne McSherry, Content Moderation is Broken. Let Us
Count the Ways., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019
/04/content-moderation-broken-let-us-count-ways; ELIŠKA PÍRKOVÁ & JAVIER PALLERO, TWENTYSIX RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONTENT GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR LAWMAKERS, REGULATORS,
AND COMPANY POLICY MAKERS 35 (2020).
3. Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Aug. 10, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://twitter.com/jack/status
/1027962500438843397; Monika Bickert, Updating the Values That Inform Our Community Standards,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 12, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/updating-the-valuesthat-inform-our-community-standards/; Patrick McGee, Apple Commits to Freedom of Speech After Criticism
of China Censorship, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/a88f5d3d-0102-46168b3f-cb0661ba305d.
4. Monika Bickert, Defining the Boundaries of Free Speech on Social Media, in THE FREE SPEECH
CENTURY 254, 260 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2018).
5. See Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011);
John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31
(Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs].
6. UNGPs, supra note 5, ¶ 6.
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third pillar of “remedying” human rights abuses where platform appeals systems
provide “remedies” for mistaken decisions that violate human rights.7
The UNGPs are non-binding but are an important tool for holding companies
accountable for their human rights impacts. Their status as amongst the most widely
backed global norms gives them normative and instinctive appeal for companies
looking for global standards to guide their decisions with respect to rights.
But there is also a less optimistic possibility: companies are embracing the
terminology so readily because they know that, in reality, it will not act as much of
a constraint at all. As non-binding norms, there is no mechanism to coerce a
company into compliance. Furthermore, lack of transparency, information
asymmetries, and complexities in discerning the exact nature of a company’s
obligations make direct enforcement difficult. A variant of “bluewashing,”8
companies can wrap themselves in the language of human rights, co-opting its
legitimacy at little cost.
Indeed, it may be even worse than that: given the momentum around the call
for companies to adopt IHRL standards, it would almost be irrational for companies
not to embrace these standards if they do not require substantive changes. As more
companies sign on with little sign of radical adjustments to their operations or
business models, IHRL becomes signaling and mere cheap talk if it does not bring
actual accountability or constraint. This is the prospect explored in this Article.
Despite this possibility, there has been almost no strong dissent from the
proposition that IHRL should be adopted by companies as the basis for their rules.9
This paper therefore aims to fill this gap with a sympathetic critique of the
contributions IHRL can make to content moderation and the very real limits of
IHRL as a practical guide to what platforms should do in many, if not most, difficult
cases.
I say my critique is sympathetic because I share many of the commitments and
aspirations of those that propound IHRL as a solution to content moderation’s

7. The issue of actual enforcement of platform rules is a hugely important question: ideal
platform policies on paper (or webpages) mean nothing if they are not consistently and accurately
enforced. But for reasons of scope, this paper largely focuses on the question of what IHRL requires
those rules to be in the first place.
8. Daniel Berliner & Aseem Prakash, “Bluewashing” the Firm? Voluntary Regulations, Program Design,
and Member Compliance with the United Nations Global Compact, 43 POL’Y STUD. J. 115, 116 (2015) (defining
“bluewashing” as when firms use engagement with United Nations initiatives to figuratively drape
themselves in the blue UN flag in order to distract stakeholders from their real, as opposed to cosmetic,
poor environmental or human rights records).
9. A recent exception is Brenda Dvoskin, Why International Human Rights Law Cannot Replace
Content Moderation, MEDIUM (Oct. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/whyinternational-human-rights-law-cannot-replace-content-moderation-d3fc8dd4344c. Others have also
offered constructive criticisms. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 2, at 968–70; Susan Benesch, But Facebook’s
Not a Country: How to Interpret Human Rights Law for Social Media Companies, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL.
ONLINE BULL. 86, 90 (2020).

LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

2021]

41

current woes. I too search for a principled way to constrain the private power that
a few dominant companies have over some of the most important channels of
expression in the modern age and believe it to be one of the most pressing human
rights questions today.10 This paper does not align itself with the “archaic way of
thinking”11 that the private nature of social media companies means they have no
duty to uphold the human rights of the people affected by their operations.
Nevertheless, I see significant limitations on what IHRL offers in practice, and I
suggest that failing to acknowledge these limitations will only serve the interests of
platforms rather than their users by giving platforms undeserved legitimacy
dividends. Proponents agree that IHRL is not a panacea for our current content
moderation woes; here, I seek to catalogue more comprehensively why not.
I proceed as follows: Part II reviews the growing consensus for an IHRLbased approach to content moderation, and the benefits of such an approach. Part
III turns to the considerable limits on what IHRL can bring to content moderation
systems and argues that invoking IHRL without being attentive to these limitations
could frustrate the goals of those seeking to promote human rights online. Part IV
illustrates this by reference to two of the most contentious issues in content
moderation: hate speech and election interference. Part V briefly suggests some next
steps in the agenda for the protection of human rights in content moderation.
There is perhaps no more consequential debate for the future of free
expression than how to legitimate and constrain platforms’ content moderation. For
IHRL to be relevant in the platform era, it needs to find purchase online and in
spaces run by private companies. But this requires being clear-eyed about the
enormity of that task and the significant obstacles that stand in the way of its
realization.
I.

WHAT INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN OFFER

As a handful of major tech companies have become ever more important
“Deciders” about what can and cannot be said in some of the most important
modern forums for speech,12 there has been increasing concern about the opacity

10. See, e.g., Evelyn Douek, Governing Online Speech: From “Posts-As-Trumps” to Proportionality &
Probability, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
11. DAVID KAYE, SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE INTERNET
119 (2019) [hereinafter KAYE, SPEECH POLICE]; David Kaye, A New Constitution for Content Moderation,
MEDIUM (June 25, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/a-new-constitution-for-content-moderation6249af611bdf [hereinafter Kaye, A New Constitution].
12. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of Facebook
and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525, 1536 (2012); Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free
Speech Lawyering in the Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2273–78 (2014); Kate Klonick,
The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1631–
35 (2018); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2021 (2018).
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and arbitrariness with which they exercise this considerable power.13 The decisions
these companies make have enormous consequences for both individuals and
societies. In the last few years alone, platforms have been implicated in rights
infringements in contexts as diverse as genocide,14 election interference,15
widespread harassment and abuse,16 and terrorist attacks.17 Content moderation
problems are human rights problems. (For simplicity, this paper focuses on users’
freedom of expression, but many of the arguments that follow would apply equally
to the entire corpus of human rights.18)
In the early days of the internet, platforms adopted what I have elsewhere
called a “posts-as-trumps” framework that generally proceeded on the assumption
that platforms would by-and-large not interfere with user content.19 This was
encouraged and enabled by generally broad immunities provided by formal law.20
But in the past few years, societal and regulatory expectations of platforms have
changed markedly, and content moderation rules have become ever-more expansive
legal-esque codes.21 Platforms no longer focus only or primarily on the speech rights
of posters, but are taking a broader (albeit still too limited) view of their
responsibility and recognizing other societal interests as well.22 But as platforms
draw these lines, pressing questions arise as to how their decisions can be made
principled and legitimate. No pre-existing body of rules easily applies.

13. See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT
MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 5–6 (2018); NICOLAS P.
SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN OUR DIGITAL LIVES 28 (2019); EMILY B.
LAIDLAW, REGULATING SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE: GATEKEEPERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 107 (2015).
14. Evelyn Douek, Why Were Members of Congress Asking Mark Zuckerberg About Myanmar? A
Primer., LAWFARE (Apr. 26, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-were-memberscongress-asking-mark-zuckerberg-about-myanmar-primer; Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s Role in the Genocide
in Myanmar: New Reporting Complicates the Narrative, LAWFARE (Oct. 22, 2018, 9:01 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates-narrati
ve.
15. RENEE DIRESTA, KRIS SHAFFER, BECKY RUPPEL, DAVID SULLIVAN, ROBERT MATNEY,
RYAN FOX, JONATHAN ALBRIGHT & BEN JOHNSON, THE TACTICS & TROPES OF THE INTERNET
RESEARCH AGENCY 101 (2019).
16. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other Myths
Confounding Section 230 Reform, U. CHI. LEGAL F. (2020).
17. Charlie Warzel, The New Zealand Massacre Was Made to Go Viral, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/opinion/new-zealand-shooting.html.
18. I also focus on purely private regulation and exclude questions of state pressure or cooptation (what Balkin has described as “collateral censorship”) that would more properly be described
as state action. See Balkin, supra note 12, at 116 (“Collateral censorship occurs when the state targets
entity A to control the speech of another entity, B.”).
19. Douek, supra note 10; Jonathan Zittrain, Three Eras of Digital Governance (Sept. 15, 2019),
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3458435.
20. Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639 (2014).
21. See generally Klonick, supra note 12.
22. Douek, supra note 10, at 24.
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Unlike other private interactions with human rights, platforms are often cast
in the role of adjudicating conflicts between rights of users or society. But unlike
state actors, private platforms are businesses that have legitimate interests in
designing and curating their services in the way they choose. Nevertheless, given
their profound systemic importance, and their own claims to be akin to “public
squares,”23 users and regulators have come to expect that platforms will have regard
for the public interest to at least some degree in the way they construct and enforce
their rules. But according to what principles? For a long time, if human rights were
considered at all, many considered that internet intermediaries were not only
upholding but expanding human rights almost simply by existing, by facilitating the
ever-greater flow of expression and information and creating a seemingly borderless
world.24 This view has waned, but exactly what should replace it remains fiercely
contested.
Against this background, in April 2018, Kaye proposed a framework for
content moderation that “puts human rights at the very centre.”25 Kaye’s central
argument was that “[c]ompanies should incorporate directly into their terms of
service and ‘community standards’ relevant principles of human rights law that
ensure content-related actions will be guided by the same standards of legality,
necessity and legitimacy that bind State regulation of expression.”26 This approach,
which he called “human rights by default,” would require platforms to explain their
rules with greater clarity and specificity, and show that infringements on freedom
of expression were narrowly tailored.
The framework in the report—which, like this Article, focused primarily on
freedom of expression issues—is that provided by Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.27 Article 19 sets out the right to freedom of
expression28 and then immediately acknowledges that the right can be subject to
certain restrictions.29 The onus is on the authority restricting speech, and a limitation
must meet three conditions:30

23. Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social Networking, FACEBOOK (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-for-social-networking
/10156700570096634/; Twitter: Transparency and Accountability: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy &
Com., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Jack Dorsey, CEO, Twitter, Inc.), https://docs.house.gov
/meetings/IF/IF00/20180905/108642/HHRG-115-IF00-Wstate-DorseyJ-20180905.pdf [hereinafter
Twitter].
24. Agnès Callamard, The Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
AGE OF PLATFORMS 191, 204–05 (Rikke Frank Jørgensen ed., 2019).
25. Kaye, supra note 1, ¶ 2.
26. Id. ¶ 45.
27. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948) art.
19, adopted Dec. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec., 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter, ICCPR].
28. ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 19(2).
29. ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 19(3), at 178.
30. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 6 U.N. Doc. A/74/48050 (Oct. 9, 2019).
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Legality: permissible restrictions are only those that are “provided by
law”—that is, a rule restricting speech must be specified precisely,
publicly, and transparently;
2. Legitimacy: the restriction needs to be for the purpose of one of a
defined set of interests: to protect rights or reputations of others,
national security, public order, public health, or morals;
3. Necessity and proportionality: the restriction must be necessary and the
least restrictive means to achieve the purported aim.
In addition, Article 20 requires the prohibition of propaganda for war and
“advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred.”
There would be a number of benefits to adopting these rules as the basis for
platforms’ content moderation rules. In what follows, I survey these benefits in a
somewhat abridged form, not least because advocates for IHRL in content
moderation have made the arguments much more forcefully and eloquently
elsewhere.
Here, I catalogue six main benefits: (A) using IHRL could give content
moderation a legitimacy that it currently lacks; (B) as a set of global norms, IHRL
aligns with major platforms’ and open internet advocates’ desire to have a single set
of global rules, to the extent possible; (C) IHRL provides a common vocabulary for
participants in debates around appropriate rules for online speech, including internal
stakeholders; (D) IHRL would provide companies with a normative basis for
denying authoritarian requests to censor content on their services; (E) IHRL
encompasses a set of procedural norms, as well as substantive ones, which can help
constrain platforms’ arbitrary exercise of power; and (F) IHRL is the least-worst
option available.
1.

A. Legitimacy
As platforms are begrudgingly drawn ever further into the task of transparently
writing and justifying rules for how they will deal with content on their services,
their apparent arbitrariness and lack of consistent enforcement has caused a severe
legitimacy deficit.31 For years, academics and civil society have been pointing out
the awesome and arbitrarily exercised power of these companies,32 but the past few
years have seen these views break through into mainstream consciousness and cause

31. Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s “Oversight Board:” Move Fast with Stable Infrastructure and Humility, 21
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 18 (2019).
32. I cannot possibly do justice to all the important early voices here, but for some notable
examples, see for example, REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE
WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM (2012); Jillian C. York, Policing Content in the QuasiPublic Sphere, OPENNET INITIATIVE 1 (2010), https://opennet.net/policing-content-quasi-publicsphere.
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a societal “techlash.”33 The delegitimization of existing systems of governance and
the frustration with the ad hoc way platforms write and enforce rules has been so
widespread that even Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has been forced to concede
that “[l]awmakers often tell me we have too much power over speech, and frankly
I agree. . . . [W]e need a more standardized approach.”34
On its face, IHRL seems to remedy this legitimacy deficit. As a set of global
norms based on as close to universal state consent as anything, IHRL offers “a sense
of global legitimacy, credibility, and appeal, especially outside the United States.”35
In the words of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, IHRL is “the only
tested international set of rules and principles resulting from decades of debate and
collaboration among States and international legal experts from around the globe.”36
As Kaye explains, “it would offer a globally recognized framework for designing
[the] tools [to accommodate varied interests] and a common vocabulary for
explaining their nature, purpose and application to users and State.”37
In contrast to the current paradigm of platforms largely just “making rules
up,”38 IHRL ostensibly offers a form of constraint on decision-making as a set of
established norms external to the platforms.
B. Global Rules
The “global” nature of IHRL is an inherent part of its appeal. For many, “[t]he
doctrine of human rights has aspired from the outset to be universal, to be a
doctrine that applies everywhere to everyone, irrespective of nationality, culture,
tradition, ideology, or social conditions.”39 The alternative is a cacophony of
differing and conflicting national, regional, and even local standards.

33. Eve Smith, The Techlash Against Amazon, Facebook and Google—and What They Can Do,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-techlashagainst-amazon-facebook-and-google-and-what-they-can-do; Rana Foroohar, Year in a Word: Techlash,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/76578fba-fca1-11e8-ac0057a2a826423e.
34. Mark Zuckerberg, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg: The Internet Needs New Rules. Let’s Start in These
Four Areas., WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/markzuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f0504-521a11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html.
35. Sejal Parmar, Facebook’s Oversight Board: A Meaningful Turn Towards International Human Rights
Standards?, JUST SECURITY (May 20, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/70234/facebooks-oversightboard-a-meaningful-turn-towards-international-human-rights-standards.
36. Letter from the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to the President of the
European Commission (Sept. 7, 2020), https://europe.ohchr.org/EN/Stories/Documents/2020%
2009%2007%20Letter%20HC%20to%20EC%20President.pdf.
37. Kaye, supra note 1, at 15.
38. MATTHIAS C. KETTEMANN & WOLFGANG SCHULZ, SETTING RULES FOR 2.7 BILLION: A
(FIRST) LOOK INTO FACEBOOK’S NORM-MAKING SYSTEM: RESULTS OF A PILOT STUDY 28 (2020).
39. Antonio Cassese, A Plea for a Global Community Grounded in a Core of Human Rights, in
REALIZING UTOPIA 136, 136 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012).
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IHRL’s aspiration for universality aligns with that of platforms. Platforms
generally prefer, for reasons of ease and product experience, to have a single set of
global rules. As Facebook’s head of policy has written, “[t]he borderless and
dynamic nature of social media communications requires standards that are globally
applied.”40 Adopting IHRL as this set of global norms avoids a “race to the bottom”
caused by adopting the rules of any particular jurisdiction. In some ways, this also
keeps alive the optimism and hope of a borderless internet. As Goldsmith and Wu
summarized the view of “internationalists” advocating for international norms in
the early days of the internet, “[n]ot only would internationalism solve the problem
of conflicting laws, it also offered the promise of better laws. . . . An international
approach could not only clear up confusion and conflict, but it could also wash
clean the prejudice and ignorance hiding in the basement of national government.”41
Therefore, ambitions for IHRL as a universalizing body of law finds common
ground with those of platforms and internet-optimists in the use of IHRL as a basis
for a system of global governance of online speech.
C. Common Vocabulary
Because the substantive rules for platform standards will almost always be a
matter of reasonable disagreement and contestation, legitimacy for content
moderation systems needs to be earned not by unilaterally issuing “correct” rules
but by channeling debate about what those rules should be.42 In fulfilling this need,
IHLR can provide “a common conceptual language” for explaining, justifying, and
challenging content moderation decisions.43 Even when IHRL does not dictate a
specific substantive outcome, it can provide a framework and vocabulary for
argumentation,44 which can facilitate a process of deliberation and public reasongiving that endows decisions with greater legitimacy.45 Engaging in reasoning and
justifying decisions is a way of showing respect for and dignifying the interests of
those affected by decisions,46 as well as providing accountability through public and
transparent reasoning.47 (This is, to many, a weak form of accountability to be sure,
40. Bickert, supra note 4, at 260. It is fascinating to observe that in dismissing the
appropriateness of a single set of laws as being the basis of those standards, Bickert did not even
consider IHRL when writing in late 2018—so rapid has the movement, spearheaded by Kaye,
progressed.
41. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 26–27 (2006).
42. See Douek, supra note 31, at 66–76.
43. Sander, supra note 2, at 967.
44. Id. at 968.
45. On the way in which frameworks and argumentation can provide this form of legitimacy,
see, for example, Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of
Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 141 (2010).
46. Monica Hakimi, Why Should We Care About International Law?, MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1302
(2020); see Douek, supra note 10, at 21–22.
47. Hakimi, supra note 46, at 1305; see Douek, supra note 31, at 66–76.
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but it remains a valuable one.) I argue below that global consensus not only does
not exist but likely never will.48 But the benefit of a common vocabulary does not
depend on substantive agreement; indeed, its virtue lies in providing the framework
and vocabulary for ongoing and unavoidable debates.
This also applies within companies, where IHRL can give internal stakeholders
the language and normative backing to articulate concerns about and potential
constraints on company decision-making.49 A more IHRL-centered discourse
around the impacts of content moderation decisions provides a coherent
framework and greater normative force to conversations at all stages of platform
operations and can operate as a positive feedback loop.
D. Stiffened Spines
The normative force of IHRL is at its greatest and most important in stiffening
the spines of companies against obvious state abuses of human rights. Adopting
IHRL can help companies stand up to governmental demands that companies
infringe users’ rights. As Kaye argued, “[a] human rights framework enables forceful
normative responses against undue State restrictions—provided companies play by
similar rules.”50 When governments demand censorship,
[i]t is much less convincing to say to authoritarians, “We cannot take down
that content because that would be inconsistent with our rules,” than it is
to say, “Taking down that content would be inconsistent with the
international human rights our users enjoy and to which your government
is obligated to uphold.”51
Therefore, as IHRL promises global substantive standards, it also provides
normative backing for denying governments who would have platforms deviate
from those standards. This was exactly how Facebook invoked IHRL when it said
it would challenge a legal order from the Thai government to block access to a
group with one million members; the group criticised the country’s king, which is
illegal under the country’s lèse majesté laws.52
This is a compelling argument and an important contribution that IHRL can
make. The value of this role is critical given the rapid rise of digital authoritarianism
around the world, as repressive regimes seek to crack down on fundamental

48. See infra Part III(A)–(C).
49. I am grateful to Dierdre Mulligan and Jen Daskal for stressing the importance of this point.
50. Kaye, supra note 1, at 14; see also KAYE, SPEECH POLICE, supra note 11, at 18.
51. Kaye, A New Constitution, supra note 11.
52. Patpicha Tanakasempipat, Facebook Blocks Group Critical of Thai Monarchy Amid Government
Pressure, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2020, 10:44 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-facebook
/facebook-blocks-group-of-one-million-critical-of-thai-monarchy-amid-government-pressure-idUSK
BN25K25C.
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freedoms online.53 IHRL’s role in these rainy-day scenarios is vital. But, as I explore
below, the question of whether a state is violating its obligations under IHRL is
often a much easier one to answer (and still by no means determinate) than how a
private actor should directly apply IHRL in making its decisions.54
E. Process
IHRL should not be understood merely as a set of substantive rules to be
picked up, plugged into community standards, and applied by platforms. A large, if
not dominant, part of the benefits offered by IHRL to content moderation is the
procedural obligations it requires. The idea is not that platforms look to existing
determinations of how restrictions on freedom of expression comply with the
requirements of legality, legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality, but that they
must meet each of these requirements themselves in formulating their rules.
This is a fundamental point for two reasons. First, as I explore further below,55
the substantive rules in IHRL are not settled and, perhaps more importantly, leave
many gaps that need to be filled in practice. Second, it is the process of reasoning that
redounds to the legitimacy benefits discussed above. It is not the mere fact that
interests have been recognized and balanced in the formulation of a rule, but the
explanation of how the decision-maker has done so that makes a decision more
likely to be deemed worthy of respect.56
The application of IHRL’s procedural obligations is the easiest to apply to
company activities, and activists have long used IHRL to emphasize company
obligations of transparency, due process, and remediation.57 Kaye similarly drew
attention to IHRL’s procedural requirements as a necessary part of fully
empowering users and enhancing accountability, especially transparency58 and
remediation, for people wronged by platform decisions.59
It is worth noting, however, that there is a tendency to oversimplify the
guidance that IHRL offers and its applicability to content moderation ecosystems.
The general understanding is that while there may be variation or ambiguity around
53. ADRIAN SHAHBAZ & ALLIE FUNK, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2019: THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL
MEDIA 1 (2019).
54. I will return to this in Parts III(A)–(C) below.
55. See infra Part III(A)–(C).
56. BEN BRADFORD, FLORIAN GRISEL, TRACEY L. MEARES, EMILY OWENS, BARON L.
PINEDA, JACOB N. SHAPIRO, TOM R. TYLER & DANIELI EVANS PETERMAN, REPORT OF THE
FACEBOOK DATA TRANSPARENCY ADVISORY GROUP 34 (2019); see also Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice,
Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 Crime & Just. 283 (2003); Douek, supra note 31, at 67.
57. Molly K. Land, Regulating Private Harms Online: Content Regulation Under Human Rights Law, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF PLATFORMS 285, 288 (Rikke Frank Jørgensen ed., 2019).
58. Kaye, supra note 1, at 20 (“The companies must embark on radically different approaches
to transparency at all stages of their operations, from rule-making to implementation and development
of “case law” framing the interpretation of private rules.”).
59. Id. at 18.
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substantive protections, “there is more widespread agreement regarding the
procedures that are essential to ensure protection for the categories of speech that
are deemed legal.”60 These requirements should include an individualized
determination by an independent arbiter on a case-by-case basis.61
But the scale of content moderation makes such individualized assessment,
even if only for appeals of initial decisions, likely impractical and impossible.62 To
deny such an assessment will not necessarily always be an infringement on rights:
due process rights—what process is due—have always been highly contextual and
systemic.63 The extent of individualized assessment required will turn on many
factors, including the particular category of content in question, the average
accuracy of initial decisions, the severity of the consequences of the initial decision,
and a cost-benefit assessment of the value offered by any additional procedure.
It is beyond my present scope to offer a full account of these factors, but it is
sufficient to note that even in the realm of procedural requirements, IHRL does not
necessarily provide a determinate answer of what is required. Furthermore, as I
explore further below, as valuable as procedural rules are, they still need to be
backed by substantive commitments to be made meaningful.64
F. The Least-Worst Option
Finally, and the importance of this should not be underestimated, IHRL is
appealing because there is no obvious and compelling alternative. Designers of
content moderation systems are in search of a way to legitimize global rules about
human rights written and enacted by extremely powerful private companies. As
Bowers and Zittrain observe, “[t]he inwards-looking, largely public relationsoriented content governance models so widely deployed today are unsatisfying.”65
They are largely untethered from any particular normative commitments, leaving
them unconstrained and arbitrary. The question of whether IHRL is a good basis
for content moderation rules should be asked not in a vacuum but as compared to
what? IHRL need not be perfect to be the least-worst option. With current systems
delegitimized and the laws of individual countries inappropriate for international
application, IHRL has a strong claim to being the worst option except for all the
rest.
60. Dawn C. Nunziato, The Beginning of the End of Internet Freedom, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 383, 396
(2014).
61. Emma J. Llansó, No Amount of “AI” in Content Moderation Will Solve Filtering’s Prior-Restraint
Problem, BIG DATA & SOC'Y 1, 4 (2020); see generally Nunziato, supra note 60.
62. See Evelyn Douek, Verified Accountability: Self-Regulation of Content Moderation as an Answer to
the Special Problems of Speech Regulation, HOOVER INST. 1, 8–11 (2019).
63. Id. at 9.
64. See infra Part III(D).
65. John Bowers & Jonathan Zittrain, Answering Impossible Questions: Content Governance in an Age
of Disinformation, 1 HARV. KENNEDY SCH. MISINFO. REV. 1, 5 (2020).
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II. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTENT MODERATION
The movement for IHRL to be adopted as the basis for content moderation
rules has garnered considerable momentum because of these strong arguments in
its favor. For a long time, platforms argued that “human rights are neither their
concern nor their responsibility”66 and were “reluctant to view content moderation
undertaken to enforce their terms of service (TOS) as a human rights issue.”67 It is
therefore no small feat to have them recognize otherwise.
But to return to the question asked in the introduction: why have platforms
suddenly voluntarily signed on? The explanation that they genuinely care about
human rights is not enough: if it were, there are many other steps they could take
including, at a minimum, being much more transparent about their services, hiring
more content moderators (and providing them better working conditions), or
introducing more friction and reducing the extent to which their algorithms
optimize for engagement. (And, notably, on the rare occasions platforms have taken
such steps, they rarely articulate them as being responsive to IHRL obligations.)
There are very real limits on what companies are prepared to voluntarily do in the
name of human rights, and yet they have relatively quickly been prepared to profess
to adopt IHRL in their content moderation rules.68
This Part argues that companies are prepared to make these commitments
largely because simply adopting IHRL as the basis of content moderation would
not constrain the operations of these platforms to any significant extent. As a result,
it would likely not give them the legitimacy benefits they hope for; but it may still
get them more than they have earned if their adoption of IHRL is not viewed
critically.
This is not to dismiss the contributions that IHRL can make in this area. But
this requires being very upfront about its limitations so that its weaknesses can be
addressed. These extend well beyond the most simple and obvious: their nonbinding nature. The inability to directly enforce IHRL in this context is in part the
product of, and at the very least exacerbates, other weaknesses. These weaknesses
include the following: (A) the consensus with respect to IHRL is not simple or
universal and in fact is highly contested, especially when it comes to freedom of
expression; (B) IHRL is not a single, self-contained, cohesive body of rules but
includes gaps, inconsistencies, and is subject to differing interpretations; (C) there
is a large degree of indeterminacy in IHRL norms that would leave platforms with
extensive discretion in many if not most hard cases; (D) given this, there is room
for platforms to co-opt the language and legitimacy of IHRL; (E) even if platforms
were to try to adopt IHRL in good faith, they lack the information or competency
to conduct the assessment and balancing of interests necessary; (F) the
MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 273.
DAVID SULLIVAN, ASS’N FOR PROGRESSIVE COMM., BUSINESS AND DIGITAL RIGHTS:
TAKING STOCK OF THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ICT
SECTOR 16 (2016).
68. See supra Part I.
66.
67.
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indeterminacy and competency critiques apply equally to the procedural norms
under IHRL as they do to the substantive norms; and (G) the platform era requires
a paradigm-shift in thinking about rights, from individualistic to systemic, and IHRL
has not yet developed jurisprudence or tools to deal with this fundamental change.
It is worth noting at the outset that many people have suggested that IHRL
obligations should vary depending on the size and systemic importance of the
platform in question.69 This Article does not consider this point, except to note that
it is only further indicative of the open nature of many of the relevant questions.
My present focus, however, is on the indeterminacy that remains even if the analysis
is confined to the largest platforms that claim to be “public squares.”70
A. Highly Contested
Even if it could be said that there is a single cohesive body of law called
“IHRL” (I contest this in the following sub-parts), the unanimity with respect to
the legitimacy of this body of norms is far from complete. As Anthea Roberts has
comprehensively documented, “international lawyers’ romantic understanding of
themselves and their field as universal and cosmopolitan” is incomplete and
sometimes misleading.71 Far from being a cohesive whole, international law is
characterized by different understandings from different relevant communities,
while certain communities dominate in shaping the field.72 To the extent that there
is universality, this itself reflects a set of values of cosmopolitanism and belief in the
efficiency of uniformity that is contested.
There is no area in which this is more true than with respect to freedom of
expression. There are still significant numbers of states with reservations to the
freedom of expression provisions in international treaties.73 As one judge of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda commented, “[t]he number and extent
of the reservations [to these provisions] reveal that profound disagreement persists
in the international community[;] . . . a consensus among states has not
crystallized.”74 As even Evelyn Aswad—a staunch advocate for IHRL in content
moderation—acknowledges, “[t]he scope of ICCPR Article 20 remains
controversial to this day.”75 Famously, of course, this includes the United States,
and many of those accustomed to First Amendment jurisprudence continue to
69. See, e.g., Land, supra note 57; KATE JONES, CHATHAM HOUSE, ONLINE DISINFORMATION
AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE: APPLYING A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 6 (2019).

70. Zuckerberg, supra note 23; Twitter, supra note 23.
71. ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 6 (2017).
72. See, generally, ROBERTS, supra note 71.
73. Amal Clooney & Philippa Webb, The Right to Insult in International Law, 48 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2017).
74. Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment on Appeal, at 376 (Nov. 28,
2007) (Meron, J., dissenting).
75. Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
26, 37 (2018).
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reject any notion of convergence towards the international standards.76 My point
here is not to take a position in this debate, but simply to note that under these
conditions it cannot truly be said that IHRL reflects a global consensus.
Advocates argue that just because states fail to live up to their obligations does
not mean that the obligations themselves are indeterminate or contested.77
Aspirational norms can still have value, to be sure. But there is a tension in relying
on state consent as a basis for IHRL’s legitimacy and ignoring state divergence or
contestation on difficult edge cases.
Here, and in what follows, it is important not to overstate my argument or the
extent of the divergence. There are “many areas in which international and regional
human rights law have substantively converged with the US protection of freedom
of expression.”78 Nevertheless, focusing on the marginal and exceptional cases
where this is not true is not misplaced because it is precisely in those cases that
IHRL has the most work to do. Where there is convergence and unanimity, IHRL
does not in substance add much beyond rhetorical legitimation. Rules that match
both universal and local norms are easy cases. Facebook does not—or, at least,
should not—need IHRL to know that incitement to genocide is wrong. But it is in
the harder cases where reasonable minds can differ that platforms are most in need
of constraint and legitimation. And yet it is in those cases—the very cases where
IHRL stands to offer the most—where there is a divergence of approach among
states and IHRL’s indeterminacy are also the greatest.
B. No Global Norms
As I have written elsewhere:
It is something of a misnomer to speak of international human rights law
as if it is a single, self-contained and cohesive body of rules. Instead, these
laws are found in a variety of international and regional treaties that are
subject to differing interpretations by states that are parties to the
conventions as well as international tribunals applying the laws.79
In the context of a right to insult, for example, Amal Clooney and Philippa Webb
have shown IHRL is sometimes confusing or inconsistent and treaties have not
been applied clearly or consistently.80 This applies to the Human Rights
Committee’s interpretations of the ICCPR and other international treaties, and is
76. See, e.g., Suzanne Nossel, The American Approach to Free Speech Is Flawed—But It’s the Best Option
We Have, SLATE, (July 28, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/07/america-freespeech-first-amendment-misinformation.html; Clooney & Webb, supra note 73.
77. Evelyn Aswad, To Protect Freedom of Expression, Why Not Steal Victory from the Jaws of Defeat?,
77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 609, 632–33 (2020).
78. Sarah H. Cleveland, Hate Speech at Home and Abroad, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 210,
210 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019).
79. Douek, supra note 1.
80. Clooney & Webb, supra note 73, at 36.
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compounded by confusion and contradictions in various regional instruments and
their interpretation by regional bodies.81 As Barrie Sander notes, while platforms
can look to “the UN treaty bodies, the jurisprudence of international, regional and
national courts, as well as reports produced by UN Special Rapporteurs and civil
society groups—the guidance produced by these sources has not always been clear
or consistent.”82 Indeed, “[g]lobal human rights norms—from binding treaty
provisions to soft law recommendations of international human rights bodies—are
diverse, nuanced, evolving, sometimes inconsistent, and contested, especially in the
area of freedom of expression.”83 In short, as Benesch summarizes, “human rights
law on speech is confusing and not always applicable to private companies.”84
Aswad has argued that the UNGP’s should be taken to require companies to
align their rules with “international human rights law,” and “regional human rights
instruments (and monitoring bodies) are not international human rights instruments
(and monitoring bodies).”85 But regional jurisprudence should not be so quickly
dismissed. Aside from the fact that regional treaties are definitionally part of
international law, they also play an important normative and practical role in IHRL
jurisprudence and norm-setting. The language of “IHRL” narrowly conceived as
only the ICCPR remains broad and general, leaving many gaps to be at best filled,
and at worst exploited. As Clooney and Webb conclude, “[i]nternational law on free
speech is . . . not well defined in the jurisprudence of the U.N. bodies, leaving far
too much scope for abuse. The fears voiced by many states during the drafting of
the ICCPR and CERD regarding free speech have turned out to be well-founded:
the terms used are too vague and susceptible to abuse.”86 Kaye himself has argued
that the jurisprudence of regional bodies plays an important role in IHRL:
[S]ome might say that human rights law is too general for the companies
to apply. But companies have ample jurisprudence to draw from. . . . This
jurisprudence can be found in the European Court of Human Rights, the
Inter-American Court for Human Rights, the emerging jurisprudence of
regional and sub-regional courts in Africa, national courts in democratic
societies, treaty bodies that monitor compliance with their norms, and the
work of UN and regional human rights mechanisms. It is not an answer to
say the law does not exist because some look down upon it as a lesser form
of law, or because of ignorance that this body of law even exists.87

See also Parmar, supra note 35.
Sander, supra note 2, at 40.
Parmar, supra note 35 (emphasis added).
SUSAN BENESCH, PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED REGULATION OF HARMFUL ONLINE
CONTENT 15 (2020).
85. Aswad, supra note 75, at 44; see also Aswad, supra note 77, at 642.
86. Clooney & Webb, supra note 73, at 44.
87. Kaye, A New Constitution, supra note 11.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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Looking to these norms is not only practically necessary to fill in relevant gaps, but
also normatively desirable: to the extent that speech decisions are highly contextual
and need to take account of local norms and facts, the jurisprudence of regional
bodies will obviously be relevant and enlightening.88
International lawyers “often resist emphasizing national or regional
approaches because they are seen as potentially threatening to the field’s universalist
aspirations.”89 But it is a different set of universalist aspirations that have been
partially responsible for some of the greatest failures in content moderation and
early internet governance. Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu proved prescient in their
observation that alongside globalization would remain “the determined
preservation of difference, the deliberate resistance to homogenizing influence” as
different places fight to retain their own cultures and values.90 They defended this
as normatively desirable: “[T]here is very little to say in favor of a single global rule
for Internet speech. . . . These dramatically different attitudes toward proper speech
among the mature democracies reflect important differences among the peoples
that populate these countries—differences in culture, history, and tastes.”91
Platforms’ unduly unidimensional understanding of free expression, and
failure to adjust to local contexts, is one of the most naïve assumptions of the early
platform era. It should not be repeated in the adoption of IHRL in content
moderation. Indeed, IHRL is a body of norms that welcomes diversity: this is a
strength in many respects but a weakness when looking for a determinate source of
constraint on platform decisions.
Even if, as I have just argued against, universal norms are the ultimate goal,
interactions between regional systems and the universal one can lead to “converging
norms and procedures in an overarching interdependent and dynamic system. In
many respects they are thinking globally and acting regionally.”92 Abandoning
regional differentiation for top-down imposition of norms is unlikely to be
successful.
“Thinking globally and acting regionally” is, in many ways, exactly what critics
have been calling on social media platforms to do. One of the main criticisms that
global platforms have encountered in recent years has been their lack of attention
to different demands of varying contexts.93 Regional bodies are an important way

JONES, supra note 69, at 31.
ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 20.
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 41, at 183.
Id. at 150.
Dinah Shelton, The Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems, in THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 351, 356 (Burns H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks eds., 1999).
93. See, e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS
US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 27 (2018); Chinmayi Arun, Rebalancing Regulation of Speech: HyperLocal Content on Global Web-Based Platforms, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 2-3 (2018);
KAYE, SPEECH POLICE, supra note 11, at 117.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

2021]

LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

55

of understanding local context. It may be that regional interpretations are different
because the context is different. That is: while regional interpretations may not be
invoked to justify departure from decisions under the ICCPR,94 different outcomes
may not be the result of different rules, but instead a product of different
circumstances.
Malcolm D. Evans has even argued that the emergence of “variegated and
complex pattern of jurisdictional networks” in IHRL is a sign of its growing
maturity.95 Dinah Shelton agrees: “Each uses the jurisprudence of the other systems
and amends and strengthens its procedures with reference to the experience of the
others. In general, their mutual influence is highly progressive, both in normative
development and institutional reform.”96
All of these caveats about the diversity of approaches in various bodies
interpreting rights apply especially forcefully in the context of the novel and open
questions that content moderation raises. Brenda Dvoskin has examined one useful
example: the question of whether the use of filtering systems at the time of upload
to detect and block certain kinds of content (that is, a form of prior restraint) is
consistent with international law. The Court of Justice of the European Union has
held that in certain cases such artificial intelligence filters are not only consistent
with European law but may in fact be required by it.97 But, as Dvoskin observed,
“the remedies the CJEU offered are explicitly forbidden in the American
Convention on Human Rights. Specifically, the American Convention forbids prior
restraint of speech and does not allow for the type of balancing test that is
permissible in the European context.”98
There is no decision as yet interpreting ICCPR Article 19’s application to
upload filters specifically, or authoritative guidance about such interpretation, save
reports of experts such as Kaye. There may be a case or comment in time, but in
the meantime, content moderation systems will make billions if not trillions of
decisions and any slow-moving jurisprudence will likely be almost immediately
94. Kaye, supra note 30, at 9–10.
95. Malcolm D. Evans, The Future(s) of Regional Courts on Human Rights, in REALIZING UTOPIA
261, 273 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012).
96. Shelton, supra note 92, at 356.
97. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 45-46 (Oct.
3, 2019).
98. Brenda Dvoskin, Why International Human Rights Law Cannot Replace Content Moderation,
MEDIUM (Oct. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/why-international-human-rightslaw-cannot-replace-content-moderation-d3fc8dd4344c. This was the opinion of the former Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Convention Catalina Botero, Catalina
Botero Marino (Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression), Freedom of Expression and the Internet,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., at ¶ 88, OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF. 11/13 (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/docs/reports/2014_04_08_internet_eng%20_web.pdf,
and a decision of the Supreme Court of Argentina interpreting the Convention, Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Nación [CSJN][National Supreme Court of Justice], 29/10/2014, “Rodriguez, Maria Belén
c/ Google Inc. s/ daños y perjuicios,” Fallos (2014-R-522) (Arg.), http://www.saij.gob.ar/cortesuprema-justicia-nacion-federal-ciudad-autonoma-buenos-aires-rodriguez-maria-belen-google-inc-otro
-danos-perjuicios-fa14000161-2014-10-28/123456789-161-0004-1ots-eupmocsollaf.
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superseded by advances in technology. As platforms continue to operate, if they
want to apply IHRL, they themselves will need to make a number of choices about
what that body of law requires.
Again, while inconsistencies and gaps in these bodies of law cannot be
dismissed, the problems they cause should also not be overstated. No body of law
is completely comprehensive or consistent. Uncertainty and ambiguity are part of
the evolution of any legal doctrine. But the critique that there are no global norms
remains important for two reasons.
First, no legal system has good answers for the most difficult questions in
content moderation yet. Many of these questions are still essentially open, leaving
platforms with practically no guidance. International law’s particularly broad
language and slow-moving machinery makes this an especially acute issue.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, not acknowledging gaps or
inconsistencies exacerbates the extent to which vague language can be open to abuse
by denying how much agency and choice there is for private actors who assert to
be simply applying IHRL. Furthermore, it risks leaving the project of advancing
IHRL open to the critique that it is simply “looking out over a crowd and picking
out [its] friends.”99 IHRL includes regional jurisprudence and acknowledging both
the strengths and weaknesses of this is the most candid way to advance the project,
as well as an attempt to avoid its manipulation and misuse.
Perhaps most importantly: even if a universal system that disregards regional
jurisprudence is the preferred solution, it does not naturally follow that platforms
themselves are the best actors to resolve inconsistencies or plug (the many) gaps.100
C. Indeterminacy
The question of whether basing content moderation rules on IHRL would be
beneficial needs to be answered, at least in part, by examining the extent to which
standards would be different from what they would be without looking to IHRL. And
this question, in turn, depends on the extent to which IHRL would constrain
platform decision-making. If IHRL still leaves platforms with wide discretion to do
what they would have done anyway, its utility is significantly diminished (but not
entirely because, aside from substantive rules, there are still the potential discursive
and argumentative benefits101). The question can be posed as: Does consulting
IHRL make a putative platform lawyer feel compelled to adopt a policy they would
not have otherwise adopted?
The variance and flexibility in state laws about speech are enough to show
considerable residual discretion in the interpretation and application of IHRL. As
99. Adam Liptak, U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html (quoting Chief Justice Roberts).
100. See infra Part III(E).
101. See infra Part III(D).
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Andrew Legg observes (following James Crawford), although the Human Rights
Committee has largely declined to explicitly talk of giving states a “margin of
appreciation” in the implementation of their obligations under IHRL, there is ample
evidence supporting the proposition that it forms part of the Committee’s practice
and that the Committee applies limitations differently in different cultural or
economic circumstances.102 This inherent flexibility is likely to be all the more true
for platforms, which have further room for adaptation created by the essentially
unprecedented process of translating state-based free expression norms into the
fresh and different context of the online environment.
Worse still, such variance will depend on the particular platforms’ product,
technical capacity, and other contextual factors. As Benesch observes, “If [IHRL]
come[s] to guide online content moderation, different platforms may derive quite
different rules from them.”103 Indeed, as the non-governmental organization Article
19 has observed:
A degree of variation is inherent to [IHRL]. . . . In the case of [platforms],
this margin of appreciation in the application of international standards will
allow the application of standards in a specific country context (as is
generally the case with international standards), and the differentiation
between different companies and their respective products (e.g., Facebook
is different from Twitter), including the liberty of a company to adopt
stricter restrictions on freedom of expression to accommodate their own
editorial choices (although it should be clear that market dominance would
result in a narrower margin of appreciation in this respect).104
Even disregarding regional instruments, different rights protected by IHRL will
often come into conflict. As the Human Rights Review of Facebook’s Oversight
Board observed, in cases where rights conflict “it will be important for the
Oversight Board to have a clear approach to ‘counterbalancing’ different human
rights,” and recommending a form of structured proportionality testing for doing
so.105 A civil rights audit admonished Facebook, for example, for taking an unduly
“selective view of free expression as Facebook’s most cherished value,” without
accounting for impacts on other rights.106 Ultimately, there will always be room for
balancing values and making choices. These choices will rest with the front-line
decision-makers in content moderation: platform policy makers.

102. ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 6 (Vaughan Lowe, Dan Sarooshi & Stefan Talmon eds.,
2012).
103. BENESCH, supra note 84, at 17.
104. ARTICLE 19, SOCIAL MEDIA COUNCILS: CONSULTATION PAPER 13 (2019).
105. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW: FACEBOOK OVERSIGHT BOARD 35
(2019).
106. LAURA MURPHY, FACEBOOK’S CIVIL RIGHTS AUDIT - FINAL REPORT 9 (2020).
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This highlights a distinctive aspect of IHRL’s role in this context as opposed
to that which is seemingly directly contemplated in the UNGPs: the role of a
platform “respecting” IHRL in the context of a platform is adjudicatory. A platform
recognizes and determines disputes about the rights of its users, as balanced against
the rights of other users or society’s interests as a whole (and with its own
commercial interests always lurking in the background). This is quite a different task
from those most obviously addressed by the UNGPs (such as physical business
operations, supply chain issues, or labour rights), which do not discuss what
businesses should do when human rights obligations are more nebulous or involve
balancing various rights and interests against each other.107
In short, platform lawyers will always have a lot of leeway when they translate
IHRL into the context of their particular product and any particular case.
It is somewhat abstract to discuss this indeterminacy in generic terms, and so
I will return to this point below in the context of the specific examples of hate
speech and election interference. But the overarching point is true for many, if not
most, of the decisions platforms make, especially the most difficult and
controversial ones: there are multiple possible rights-respecting answers within the
framework offered by IHRL.
D. Co-optation
The indeterminacy of IHRL creates room for its co-optation by platforms,
rather than their being constrained by it. This is similar to charges of “bluewashing”
that have attended initiatives such as the United Nations Global Compact, where
given the lack of monitoring and enforcement, members are able to enjoy goodwill
and legitimacy benefits without costly changes.108 In the context of information
technologies specifically, a similar controversy arose in the early days of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), which was formed in 2008 in the wake of scandals in
which both Yahoo! and Google were found to be involved in human rights
violations in China. Years later, however, the Edward Snowden revelations showed
that GNI verification mechanisms had failed to reveal the extent of data collection
and sharing by many GNI members with the U.S. government.109 The Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF), a founding member of the GNI, resigned as a result.110
Platforms do make commitments to uphold human rights and have been
hiring personnel to rectify their long-standing lack of human rights expertise.111 But
107. Id. at 10. Indeed, the only reference to such “balancing” is the “difficult balancing
decisions” states have to make to “reconcile different societal needs.”
108. See, e.g., Berliner & Prakash, supra note 8, at 115, 118.
109. LAIDLAW, supra note 13, at 104–08.
110. Letter from Danny O’Brien & Jillian C. York, Elec. Frontier Found., to Glob. Network
Initiative 1 (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.eff.org/document/gni-resignation-letter (explaining decision
to withdraw from GNI).
111. MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 138–39.
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some reports suggest that such initiatives are window-dressing, with those involved
marginalized within the companies or not given sufficient resources and authority
to make a real difference.112
Facebook has taken the commendable step of commissioning human rights
impact assessments (HRIAs) in developing countries.113 But even these are telling.
The four reports released so far combined do not match the length or depth of the
Civil Rights Audit Facebook commissioned and released about its impact in the
United States.114 The recommendations were unsurprising and did not necessarily
require an in-depth understanding of IHRL; they mostly amounted to simple due
diligence before entering a volatile market. Facebook’s responses to the HRIAs
essentially promised to devote more resources to these markets, hire more staff,
provide greater language support, and pointed to a number of other initiatives that
it already had in train (such as its Oversight Board and limiting forwarding in
WhatsApp).115 This series of measures can be described as common sense. That is
not to say that they are not welcome, just that the role of IHRL could be described
as marginal or a redundancy over seriously living up to the motto “don’t be evil.”
The reports received minimal press coverage in the West (or, perhaps, anywhere),
and there were no timelines given for taking next steps, nor has there been any
follow-up.
By casting the reports as HRIAs, Facebook has co-opted the language of
IHRL without any substantial changes in operations or IHRL-specific
commitments beyond common sense due diligence. In the end, “such documents
are only worth what the receiver makes of them.”116
These same “bluewashing” risks could attend the adoption of IHRL standards
in content moderation more broadly. As Sander argues, “[g]iven [the] complexity
[of applying IHRL to platforms], the risk inevitably arises that online platforms may
try to co-opt the vocabulary of human rights to legitimize minor reforms at the
expense of undertaking more structural or systemic changes to their moderation
processes.”117 So far, so true. Even as Facebook has said it has grounded its
community standards in IHRL, researchers observed that those writing the rules

112. Nitasha Tiku, A Top Google Exec Pushed the Company to Commit to Human Rights. Then Google
Pushed Him Oout, He Says., WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology
/2020/01/02/top-google-exec-pushed-company-commit-human-rights-then-google-pushed-him-outhe-says/.
113. Miranda Sissons & Alex Warofka, An Update on Facebook’s Human Rights Work in Asia and
Around the World, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 12, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/05/
human-rights-work-in-asia/.
114. See MURPHY, supra note 106 (there was also a substantial interim report).
115. Sissons & Warofka, supra note 113, at 1, 4–5.
116. LAIDLAW, supra note 13, at 168 (noting similar concerns about a human rights audit of the
Internet Watch Foundation).
117. Sander, supra note 2, at 1006.

UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L.

60

[Vol. 6:37

“were not observed to refer to concrete human rights norms.”118 The gap between
rhetoric and practice remains.
But the risk of co-optation is even greater than in other contexts because it
runs both ways. Not only could companies co-opt IHRL rhetoric to their own
advantage, but such co-optation could bleed back into IHRL itself and influence its
development. As Aswad observes, “[i]f companies begin applying Article 19(3) in
their content moderation operations and take up the Special Rapporteur’s call to
produce ‘case law,’ there could be an active fountain of new ‘jurisprudence’
involving the ICCPR’s speech protections, which could influence the direction of
international freedom of expression rights.”119 The development of IHRL through
state practice, authoritative interpretation by treaty bodies, and relevant experts can
be slow and ad hoc. By contrast, content moderation systems work at an extremely
high pace and volume. The gap between these agile “move fast” systems and the
creaky IHRL structures is vast. As such, the extent to which private companies may
shape “international normative developments and discourse on freedom of
expression” is unclear,120 but could be profound.
E. Lack of Competency
Even setting aside concerns about bad faith co-optation of IHRL by platforms
and assuming best intentions, platforms do not have the legitimacy or competence
to determine IHRL obligations alone.
Platforms have no democratic legitimacy to draw upon when conducting the
fraught task of determining whether a particular restriction on freedom of
expression is necessary and proportionate.121 But this weakness applies to all
content moderation. There are more specific competence problems created in the
application of IHRL.
First, it is unclear which interests platforms should take into account as
justifying limitations on expression. Article 19 provides that freedom of expression
should only be limited “to protect rights or reputations of others; national security;
public order; public health or morals.”122 But as Kaye noted in his report on online
hate speech, “companies are not in the position of governments to assess threats to
national security and public order, and hate speech restrictions on those grounds
should be based not on company assessment but legal orders from a State.”123 If
this implies that companies are in a position to evaluate restrictions on speech for

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 38, at 32.
Aswad, supra note 75, at 64.
Parmar, supra note 35, at 6.
Kaye, supra note 1.
ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 19(3), at 178.
Kaye, supra note 30, ¶ 47(b)15.
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other purposes such as rights or reputations of others and public health or morals,124
experience so far is not promising.
Platforms do not necessarily have all the information necessary to evaluate the
extent to which harm is done to someone’s reputation off-platform, nor do they
have any particular competence or legitimacy to determine matters of public health
or morals. The Covid-19 pandemic has been a stark illustration of how even
ostensibly science-based public health determinations are fraught, often subject to
conflicting guidance and politicization.125 As to public morals, platforms are at best
limited judges of such social matters, and this is all the more true in the case of
quintessentially Silicon Valley-based companies purporting to determine the morals
of users around the world.126
Second, compounding matters, it is unclear the extent to which platforms can
take into account their own legitimate business and free speech interests in deciding
what to allow on their services. Unlike First Amendment doctrine, IHRL speech
protections do not extend to corporations.127 But it is not clear that denying
corporate interests entirely or making them completely subservient to individual
speech rights would be the best outcome, legally or normatively.
Legally, as Molly Land notes, while human rights institutions have tended to
simply “equate public and private censorship,” it “cannot be the case that every
content moderation decision made by every digital platform should be subject to
human rights scrutiny.”128 While the extent may be unclear, it should be relatively
uncontroversial to assert that clearly private actors can limit, curate, and privilege
content and viewpoints in a way that a state should not. Moderation of clearly legal
content is an important part of what platforms are: without it, platforms would
quickly find themselves overrun with spam, adult content, and other merely
‘unpleasant’ content that would diminish the value of their products to users and,

124. These are the other legitimate grounds for limitation of a right under article 19 of the
ICCPR.
125. There are many examples, but perhaps the starkest have been the politicization around
mask-wearing and hydroxychloroquine, both exacerbated by unclear or flat-out mistaken messaging
from the authoritative sources that platforms said they would look to in determining what content to
restrict.
126. See, e.g., Olivia Solon, Inside Facebook’s Efforts to Stop Revenge Porn Before it Spreads, NBC NEWS,
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/inside-facebook-s-efforts-stop-reven
ge-porn-it-spreads-n1083631 (“Davis gave the example of a woman in India who reported a photo in
which she was fully clothed in a pool with a fully clothed man. ‘Within her culture and family that would
not be acceptable behavior,’ Davis said. ‘The photo was shared intentionally with her family and
employer to harass her.’”); Chris Marsden, Trisha Meyer & Ian Brown, Platform Values and Democratic
Elections: How Can the Law Regulate Digital Disinformation?, 36 COMPUT. L. & SEC. (2020) (“Executives in
California, ex-politicians such as Nick Clegg, or thousands of badly-paid contractors hired off the
internet, from the Philippines or India, cannot regulate European fake news: it has to be Europeans.”).
127. Aswad, supra note 75, at 40.
128. Land, supra note 57, at 292.
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in some cases, make it unusable.129 But when a platform does so, “what values
should guide its decision?”130 Business interests cannot be an entirely illegitimate
consideration—indeed, companies have a fiduciary duty to maximize stockholder
value.131
Furthermore, there is good reason to think that preserving a diversity of
platform approaches is overall more beneficial than compelled conformity. Some
platforms may choose to try to “inspire creativity and bring joy,”132 while others will
seek to “give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly
without barriers.”133 A degree of experimentation and choice should be
welcomed.134 State-based bodies of law do not have a good answer for how to
account for this. Molly Land and Emily Laidlaw have argued, for example, that
obligations should be calibrated to the extent of a platform’s dominance or
influence on democracy.135 IHRL already supports the notion that a stronger
showing of the necessity of restrictions is required when there is a lack of viable
alternative channels for communication.136 This is echoed in the quote from Article
19, above.137
But even this leaves things fairly indeterminate and fails to answer crucial
questions such as the extent to which intermediaries can account for any unique
business mission or user preference in removing content, for example, offensive
content.138 Laidlaw concluded that IHRL just doesn’t “quite fit” with what
platforms are doing.139 For many questions about the obligations of gatekeepers,
“there is little guidance in [IHRL]”140 and the UNGPs “raise just as many questions
as they answer.”141 As such, it remains true that, as Kaye observed in 2016, it is an
“open question how freedom of expression concerns raised by design and
engineering choices should be reconciled with the freedom of private entities to
design and customize their platforms as they choose.”142
129. GILLESPIE, supra note 13, at 5.
130. Land, supra note 57, at 292.
131. Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 497, 503–04 (2019).
132. About TikTok, https://www.tiktok.com/about?lang=en (last visited Sept. 25, 2020).
133. Twitter, Inc. - Contact - FAQ, TWITTER, https://investor.twitterinc.com/contact/faq/defa
ult.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2020).
134. Sander, supra note 2, at 981.
135. Land, supra note 57, at 304.
136. Sander, supra note 2, at 981 n. 184.
137. ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 19.
138. Molly K. Land, Against Privatized Censorship: Proposals for Responsible Delegation, 60 VA. J. INT’L
L. 3631, 3932 (2020).
139. LAIDLAW, supra note 13, at 111.
140. Id. at 89.
141. Id. at 96.
142. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38 (May 11, 2016).
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In short, in restricting expression, platforms “might base these choices on
balancing public interests or their own private interests, but in neither case are they
well-placed to be trusted arbiters,”143 and IHRL does not offer concrete guidance.
F. Unearned Legitimacy Dividends
One of the strongest arguments in favor of IHRL in content moderation is
the value not of its substantive norms, which the preceding sections have argued
remain contested and indeterminate in many cases, but its procedural
requirements.144 As outlined above, on this argument, the constraining and
legitimating force of IHRL comes not from it forcing platforms to arrive at the right
decisions, but by guiding them to arrive at decisions in the right way. The requirements
of legality, legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality are intrinsically valuable,
independent from the ultimate substantive outcomes.
This aligns with arguments I have made elsewhere about the importance of
transparent and public reasoning in platform rule and decision-making in
legitimating their exercise of substantial power over speech.145 But here’s the rub:
there is nothing particular to IHRL about these requirements. The structured nature
of the tests and what they require overlaps to a very large extent with structured
proportionality testing that exists in many constitutional systems and is the globally
dominant form of judicial review.146 The requirements of a clear, precise, and
transparent statement of a rule that is justified in the pursuance of a legitimate
purpose are generic rule of law and due process requirements that can be found in
diverse areas of law.147 The tripartite test in Article 19(3) is a useful framework for
facilitating this process, but there is nothing uniquely powerful about this
framework as distinct from other forms of structured proportionality testing.

143. Douek, supra note 10, at 461.
144. See supra Part II(E).
145. See Douek, supra note 31; Douek, supra note 62; Douek, supra note 10.
146. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 72 (2008); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age
of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094 (2015); PROPORTIONALITY: NEW FRONTIERS, NEW
CHALLENGES (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark V. Tushnet eds., 2017); Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in
Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere But Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291 (2012); AHARON BARAK,
PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (Doron Kalir trans., 2012);
ALEC STONE SWEET & JUD MATHEWS, PROPORTIONALITY BALANCING AND CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE AND GLOBAL APPROACH (2019); Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as
Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018); Grégoire C. N. Webber, Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of
Constitutional Rights Scholarship, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 179 (2010); Evelyn Douek, All Out of Proportion:
The Ongoing Disagreement About Structured Proportionality in Australia, 47 FED. L. REV. 551 (2019).
147. For an argument that many of these principles underlie administrative law, see Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (2018).
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The structured nature of the test, setting out distinct steps, is important and
provides a disciplining and rationalizing effect absent in open-ended balancing.148
But it is both the strength and weakness of this kind of analysis that it can—and
must—be adapted to the particular context in which it is being used. Such structures
remain “framework[s] that must be filled with content.”149 This is a strength
because, as the preceding sections have demonstrated, there are significant
adaptations that need to be made to the unique context of social media platforms.
But it is also a weakness because this very adaptability is the thrust of one of the
major critiques of proportionality testing in global constitutionalism: it is too
indeterminate.150
My own view is that the structure and transparency of this kind of reasoning
are intrinsically valuable, regardless of the fact that it is adaptable and does not
constrain the decision-maker to particular outcomes or even particular
considerations.151 But it remains important to acknowledge this indeterminacy
openly for exactly the same reason that the transparent process of reasoning is
important in the first place: to make “the calculus behind an opinion explicit so that
it can be seen and criticized.”152 We should be cautious of letting platforms clothe
themselves in the language of IHRL and accrue legitimacy dividends merely for
meeting bare minimum transparency and justification requirements.
G. New Paradigms of Rights
Finally, and crucially (as I have argued elsewhere), technology has created the
capacity for both more speech and more speech governance than any time in history
and this requires a paradigm shift in thinking about online speech rights.153 This
paradigm requires a systemic, rather than individualistic, view of rights.
IHRL, like most constitutional systems, takes an individualistic view of speech
rights. Article 19 of the ICCPR begins “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of
expression.”154 Cases focus on particular individuals and even particular utterances.
But the scale of the major social media platforms makes such thinking ill-fitted to
modern online speech governance.

148. Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U.
TORONTO L.J. 383, 397 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal
Text, in INSTITUTIONALIZED REASON: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ROBERT ALEXY 307, 308–09
(Matthias Klatt ed., 2012).
149. BARAK, supra note 146, at 489–90.
150. Grimm, supra note 148, at 397.
151. See Douek, supra note 10.
152. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES 257 (2015).
153. This section draws on Douek, supra note 10.
154. ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 19 (emphasis added).
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Errors in content moderation at scale are inevitable,155 and therefore the more
pertinent question in the design of a content moderation system is what kinds of
errors to err on the side of.156 IHRL does not lend itself to this kind of analysis.
Instead, it suggests that rights-respecting online speech governance “requires more
than just optimizing a speech-regulation system for a small quantity of error; it
requires individualized determinations by independent arbiters.”157
But this is infeasible at internet scale, which makes literally billions of pieces
of content potentially governable every day. Kaye anticipated this argument, noting
that “[s]ome may argue that it will be time-consuming and costly to allow appeals
on every content action. But companies could work with one another and civil
society to explore scalable solutions such as company-specific or industry-wide
ombudsman programmes.”158
In my view, such scalable solutions not only practically require a more systemic
view of rights as opposed to an individualistic one, but also provide a lens that is
normatively preferable. A system that acknowledges the inevitability of error at the
outset will often lead to fewer errors in the long run than trying to design a system
on the assumption that all errors can be caught and corrected.159 Procedural
requirements are a case in point. Determining what process is due in any case, as
discussed above, is a quintessentially contextual judgment.160 Fundamentally,
the very nature of the due process inquiry indicates that the fundamental
fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained in
any individual case; rather, “procedural due process rules are shaped by the
risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the
generality of cases.”161
My point here is not to resolve the question but simply to note that IHRL alone
does not. Content moderation system design requires unprecedented thinking about
speech governance and system design which IHRL can provide some guardrails for,
but not yet ultimately answer. It needs new tools to do so, and we should not put
social media companies alone in charge of crafting and applying those tools.
This applies more broadly to the “proportionality” assessment as applied to
content moderation. One benefit of the online environment is that platforms can
155. See Evelyn Douek, COVID-19 and Social Media Content Moderation, LAWFARE (Mar. 25, 2020,
1:10 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/covid-19-and-social-media-content-moderation; Mike
Masnick, Masnick’s Impossibility Theorem: Content Moderation at Scale is Impossible to do Well, TECHDIRT (Nov.
20, 2019, 9:31 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20191111/23032743367/masnicksimpossibility-theorem-content-moderation-scale-is-impossible-to-do-well.shtml.
156. Douek, supra note 10.
157. Llansó, supra note 61, at 4 (citing Nunziato, supra note 60).
158. Kaye, supra note 1, at 18.
159. FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 23 (2009).
160. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
161. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321 (1985) (quoting Mathews,
424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)).
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develop far more nuanced remedies than have traditionally been available to
governments.162 Far beyond the false binary of choosing to leave content up or take
it down, they can choose to label it, amplify it, suppress it, demonetize it, or engage
in counter-messaging.163 IHRL encourages, if not mandates, that platforms explore
these options by requiring any measure restricting expression be necessary, in the
sense that it is the least intrusive instrument.164 Again, to date it does not offer any
guidance beyond this general command, placing essentially all content moderation
decisions into a grey zone.165 A jurisprudence can develop over time, but the
platform lawyer charged with making these determinations today is left on their
own.
III. HARD CASES
The thrust of my critique has been that using IHRL in content moderation
sounds good in theory but has limits in practice. This part illustrates this argument
by reference to some concrete examples.
I have already noted that IHRL does not give much guidance on a number of
categories of content moderation that may be mundane and not attract much
attention but actually make up the bulk of platform decision-making, such as spam,
nudity, obscenity, bullying, and self-harm. Most of this content would be protected
under IHRL as applied to states, but if platforms were forced to carry it, it would
dramatically change the nature of their services and in some cases make them
practically unusable. For example, Facebook removed 35.7 million pieces of adult
nudity in the second quarter of 2020,166 and this is even given a strongly established
and well-known norm against posting such content. Again, my point is not that
IHRL cannot adjust to these requirements, and no doubt it will do so as leading
thinkers attack the task. I only mean to underline that at present, what IHRL
requires in such a case is an important open question, likely turning on a number of
contextual factors which vary platform-by-platform. It, therefore, is limited as a
source of constraint.
Nevertheless, these are not typically the questions that dominate discussions
around content moderation, human rights, and international law. Here, I examine
two high-profile and controversial examples, hate speech and foreign election
interference, and show that IHRL would not necessarily offer determinate answers
that would help lead to greater perceived legitimacy for platform decisions.
162. Kaye, supra note 30, at 16–17.
163. Douek, supra note 10, at 26–27.
164. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶
3, 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
165. Sander, supra note 2, at 988 (“Ultimately, the application of the test of necessity is one of
the most challenging aspects of operationalizing a human rights-based approach to content
moderation.”).
166. FACEBOOK, COMMUNITY STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT REPORT 5 (2020), Q2 2020,
FACEBOOK TRANSPARENCY, https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcemen
t#adult-nudity-and-sexual-activity.
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A. Hate Speech & Holocaust Denial
In a way, all content moderation debates—perhaps even all free speech
debates—are debates about hate speech, such is the shadow the topic casts over the
field. As one of the hardest categories of content to define in the abstract and apply
in practice, concerns about how to draw the line between permissible and
impermissible speech and “who decides,” loom especially large. This subpart,
therefore, asks whether looking to IHRL makes these questions easier.
As the NGO Article 19 has noted, “‘[h]ate speech’ is an emotive concept
which has no universally accepted definition in [IHRL].”167 Indeed, the words “hate
speech” do not appear at all in IHRL treaties.168 As a result, “[i]nternational doctrine
and practice relating to prohibition of hate speech remain uneven.”169 It is also
“where the chasm between US and international approaches is the greatest,”170
potentially making adoption of IHRL in this area especially controversial.
The Rabat Plan of Action provides a useful and more detailed guide, to be
sure, proposing a six-part threshold test for what should constitute unlawful
incitement under Article 20.171 But some of these elements, such as intent and
imminence of harm, will be hard to determine and always require in-the-moment
judgments for which few prior guardrails can be provided. This is the perennial
problem with crafting rules for hate speech, which necessarily require highly
contextual judgments.172 In short, in most cases a platform will need to defend its
application of generalized IHRL to the specific context on its own terms.
Take an example of a case where IHRL might have, on its face, resolved some
persistent legitimacy problems for platforms. Facebook in particular had long come
under public pressure about its decision not to remove content denying the
historical fact of the Holocaust.173 Removal of Holocaust denial was one of the key
demands of the high-profile #StopHateForProfit campaign in 2020.174 Facebook
has stood firm for years in the face of public outrage. Aswad argued that in this

167. ARTICLE 19, SELF-REGULATION AND ‘HATE SPEECH’ ON SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS
6 (2018), https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Self-regulation-and-%E2%80%
98hate-speech%E2%80%99-on-social-media-platforms_March2018.pdf.
168. BENESCH, supra note 84, at 16.
169. Cleveland, supra note 78, at 225.
170. Id. at 210.
171. U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Report on the Expert Workshops on the Prohibition of
Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/17/ADD. 4, (Jan. 11, 2013).
172. Richard Ashby Wilson & Molly K. Land, Hate Speech on Social Media: Towards a ContextSpecific Content Moderation Policy, 52 CONN. L. REV. 1, 47 (2020).
173. Ezra Klein, The Controversy Over Mark Zuckerberg’s Comments on Holocaust Denial, Explained,
VOX (July 20, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/explainers/2018/7/20/17590694/mark-zuck
erberg-facebook-holocaust-denial-recode.
174. STOP HATE FOR PROFIT, https://www.stophateforprofit.org/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).

68

UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L.

[Vol. 6:37

context pointing to IHRL could have given Facebook the rationalization for its
decision that it struggled to find.175
But even this apparently straightforward application of IHRL is not obviously
the right answer. First, IHRL is not as clear as it could be on even this relatively
confined question. The Human Rights Committee famously found in 1996 that a
French conviction of an academic Holocaust denier did not violate Article 19 of the
ICCPR,176 although in 2011 the Committee appeared to confine the decision to its
facts in saying that “laws that penalize the expression of opinions about historical
facts are incompatible with . . . respect for freedom of opinion and expression.”177
Platforms would need to justify their reconciliation of these two conflicting
authorities. This may not be difficult: it could be explained as an evolution of IHRL
doctrine rather than an inconsistency.
But even assuming IHRL speaks clearly on the issue, do the rationales for
preventing a state from deciding on an official view of history apply equally to a
social media platform that is not seeking to criminalize such speech or prevent
academic research on the topic? What about the other different characteristics of
online speech? Kaye himself has raised the question, “[g]iven the speed, reach, and
capacity for disinformation online, should our definition of ‘online hate speech’ be
different from offline hate speech?”178 In evaluating Holocaust denial, should
platforms acknowledge Europe’s unique historical experience?
Ultimately, the position under IHRL was not enough for Facebook to resist
public pressure or otherwise prevent it from reaching a different conclusion with
respect to Holocaust denial. In late 2020, Facebook179 and Twitter180 finally joined
YouTube181 in banning such content. Do these policies breach the platforms’
obligations under IHRL? If so, what about Reddit—does its status as a smaller
platform give it greater license to “quarantine” Holocaust denial?182 Is there a
different balancing exercise for search engines, or even search functions within all
social media platforms, based on a right to truth and memory as a collective right,
175. Aswad, supra note 75, at 66.; see Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 164, ¶ ¶ 35, 49.
176. Faurisson v. France, CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993, ¶ 10 (Dec. 16, 1996).
177. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 164, ¶ 49.
178. David Kaye, Four Questions about Online Hate Speech, MEDIUM (Aug. 12, 2019), https://
medium.com/@dkisaway/four-questions-about-online-hate-speech-ae3e0a134472.
179. Monika Bickert, Removing Holocaust Denial Content, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/10/removing-holocaust-denial-content/.
180. Jacob Kastrenakes, Twitter Will Ban Holocaust Denial Posts, Following Facebook, VERGE (Oct.
14, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/10/14/21516468/twitter-holocaust-denial-bannedfacebook-policy.
181. Paresh Dave, YouTube Reversal Bans Holocaust Hoaxers, Stops Pay for Borderline Creators,
REUTERS (June 5, 2019, 9:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-youtube-hatespeechidUSKCN1T623X.
182. ADL Statement on Reddit’s New Quarantine Policy for Holocaust Denial, ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-statement-on-reddits-newquarantine-policy-for-holocaust-denial.
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as Deirdre Mulligan and Daniel S. Griffin argue, even as they acknowledge that the
exact form of this right and its implementation is thorny and complicated?183
IHRL also does not directly answer how a platform should evaluate which
local laws it should comply with as legitimate deviations from ICCPR and which it
should not. For example, while the European Court of Human Rights found in
2019 that the conviction of a German politician for Holocaust denial did not violate
the European Convention,184 Germany cannot rely on ECHR jurisprudence to
justify its deviation from the ICCPR standard that forbids such bans.185 On the
other hand, the UNGPs require platforms to comply with local law.186 So when is
a deviation from ICCPR standards merely a legitimate local law with which
companies should comply, and when is it an instance where IHRL should give them
‘stiffened spines’ to resist authoritarian demands? There might be easy cases, and
perhaps Germany’s laws on Holocaust denial fall into this bucket given its unique
historical experience, but there will be many more hard ones.
To me, it is not obvious that IHRL offers a clear and uncontestable answer to
these questions: a platform will still need to defend its decision on its own terms, in
its own context, and based on the resources and technical capacity it has to enforce
any such rules and the resulting error rates. Kaye himself seems to envision exactly
this kind of diversity, stating “[w]here company rules vary from international
standards, the companies should give a reasoned explanation of the policy
difference in advance, in a way that articulates the variation.”187
Things get worse when we move from the more confined category of denial
of historical facts to hate speech more broadly. All the same issues apply but are
compounded by the fact that the underlying IHRL norms, and especially the
relationship between Articles 19 and 20, are not always clear. This is further
compounded in the online environment where culture can evolve rapidly, be subject
to differing interpretations in different communities, and coded language is
especially prominent. Perhaps no example illustrates this as well as Pepe the Frog,
which over the course of its brief life has been a comic book character, an antiSemitic hate symbol, and a pro-Democracy message in Hong Kong.188 The
hypothetical platform Head of Policy may get some basic guidance from IHRL on

183. Deirdre K. Mulligan & Daniel S. Griffin, Rescripting Search to Respect the Right to Truth, 2 GEO.
L. TECH. REV. 557, 577–78, 582 (2018).
184. Pastörs v. Germany, App. No. 55225/14 (Oct. 3, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=
001-196148.
185. Aswad, supra note 75, at 58 n. 152.
186. Aswad, supra note 77, at n. 59.
187. Kaye, supra note 30, at 15–16.
188. Brittan Heller, Opinion, Is This Frog a Hate Symbol or Not?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/24/opinion/pepe-frog-hate-speech.html.
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how to treat such situations but cannot truly be said to be constrained by it in
deciding what to do.189
In the context of rapidly evolving language and norms, the question of errorchoice is especially acute. Does a platform have sufficient technical capacity and
resources to apply a distinction between hateful slurs and attempts by target
communities to reclaim the language, for example? If not, should the platform err
on the side of over-enforcing or under-enforcing its policy against hate speech,
acknowledging that while the former would perhaps be a precautionary approach
to protect marginalized communities it is also at odds with traditional thinking about
freedom of expression that generally errs on the side of giving free speech
“breathing space.”190 IHRL does not speak in these terms of error choice, but rather
in the language of individual cases. Practically, however, these considerations
pervade platform decision-making.191
There is, of course, a far richer and growing body of IHRL jurisprudence and
scholarship on the topic of hate speech than I could do justice to here, not in small
part because it is such a vexing issue.192 I do not mean to diminish the importance
of platforms engaging with and paying heed to this work. It can play a meaningful
role in informing their decision-making process and drawing platform lawyers’
attention to relevant considerations. My point is simply that when the rubber hits
the road, this work cannot answer specific questions or help those lawyers choose
between various alternative courses of action. The constraining value, and therefore
the legitimating force we should endow it with, will be limited.
B. Election Interference
Foreign election interference on social media is the scandal that perhaps more
than any other kicked off the “techlash” and plausibly played a significant role in
creating the public pressure that led to platforms embracing IHRL as an attempted
solution to their legitimacy deficits. And yet, as Jens David Ohlin has commented,
“international lawyers seem to be at a loss for how to understand the particular harm
posed by [Russian] interference.”193 The ICCPR of course specifies that everyone
has the right to freedom of expression “regardless of frontiers.”194 This applies even to
falsehoods—IHRL does not include an exception enabling restrictions on freedom
189. See BENESCH, supra note 84, at 16–17.
190. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964).
191. Douek, supra note 10.
192. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 30; Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 164; Wilson & Land, supra note
172; Arun, supra note 93; Cleveland, supra note 78; BENESCH, supra note 84; ARTICLE 19, 'HATE
SPEECH' EXPLAINED: A TOOLKIT (2015), https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38231/
'Hate-Speech'-Explained---A-Toolkit-%282015-Edition%29.pdf; as well as many of the pieces cited
throughout this article.
193. Jens David Ohlin, Election Interference: The Real Harm and The Only Solution (Cornell Legal
Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 18-50, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3276940.
194. ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 19 (emphasis added).
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of expression merely because content is “false.”195 Indeed, in the years following
WWII, the United States and other democratic states “monotonously” refused
Soviet Union demands for a treaty outlawing international war propaganda on the
grounds that this would jeopardize freedom of speech.196 The best cure for
international propaganda, these states maintained, was more, not less, freedom of
information.197 Thus, cross-border speech, even by states, is protected by IHRL.
The extent to which even state-sponsored doxing and disinformation operations
are in violation of IHRL is complicated by contestation around the scope of IHRL’s
extraterritorial application.198 Outlawing speech on the basis of its foreignness alone
would be a violation of international law; on the other hand, disclosure obligations,
so that actors cannot conceal or mislead users as to their identity, are in the best
counter-speech tradition.199 But here, IHRL has no work to do: every major
platform is committed—in theory—to the detection and removal of foreign
election interference.
The harder question is what level of coordination and platform manipulation,
whether foreign or domestic, is impermissible interference with an individual’s right
to seek and receive information and ideas.200 But on this question, IHRL offers little
guidance: again, no legal system does yet. This is a new frontier. The internet and
social media have blurred traditional lines between “coordinated efforts” to game a
system and the “genuine” output of users: “[m]ost contributions to the web are
somewhere in the middle, where people in some way coordinate their efforts in
order to help make their content visible to a search engine, out of a ‘genuine’ desire
for it to be seen.”201 Indeed, “defining what is coordination and what is inauthentic
is far from a value-free judgment call. . . . Coordination and authenticity are not
binary states but matters of degree, and this ambiguity will be exploited by actors of
all stripes.”202
195. KAYE, SPEECH POLICE, supra note 11, at 94.
196. JOHN B. WHITTON & ARTHUR LARSON, PROPAGANDA: TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IN
THE WAR OF WORDS 234 (1964).
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Operations on Elections, 18 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 1, 39 (2019).
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200. See, e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et. al., Joint
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(“[D]isinformation and propaganda are often designed and implemented so as to mislead a population,
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Kaye suggested in 2017 that “[i]t was not entirely clear if international norms
spoke to how governments should address” online propaganda,203 and there has
been no progress in answering that question since then. Indeed, as more and more
state actors engage in precisely this kind of activity both internationally and
domestically, being able to distill any agreed norms as a matter of IHRL seems
doubtful at best.
IV. ADVANCING IHRL IN ONLINE SPEECH GOVERNANCE
Having argued both that IHRL is the least-worst option for content
moderation baselines and that it is inadequate, it is somewhat incumbent on me to
offer a path forward. A full account is beyond my ambit here,204 but I believe there
are four takeaways from my argument so far.
First, how IHRL applies to platform governance and online speech is still
highly uncertain and developing. There should be nothing surprising about this: no
legal system has good answers yet for how to deal with the fundamental changes
that the internet has wrought to societies’ speech ecosystems. International law is
no exception. IHRL is still young and general, but “just as the vaguely worded First
Amendment has crystallized into more concrete rules, so too can international
law.”205 Constructing systems of free expression takes time, experimentation, and
incremental development. The messiness of content moderation and the role of
IHRL within it is not a failing but simply a feature of the current stage of evolution
of both.
Second, however, is that facilitating the growth of both from this period of
adolescence to maturity requires being candid about the areas in which such
development is necessary. Too much of the discourse around IHRL in content
moderation smooths over the complexities or weaknesses that will necessarily be
inherent in this process of adaptation of IHRL norms to a fundamentally new
context, which leaves them vulnerable to exploitation by the very actors that such
norms are supposed to constrain (namely, platforms).
Third, for the movement to imbue content moderation with IHRL to be
meaningful, it cannot again just outsource the interpretation and application of these
norms to the private companies themselves in the same way that content
moderation has been outsourced so far—this will only allow for the agenda’s cooptation. IHRL can provide an important source of standards for content
moderation but only if, as Benesch argues, “properly interpreted and explained by
experts.”206 I agree, but I would add a further caveat to Benesch’s caveat: human
rights expertise will not be enough to shore up the legitimacy of any such
203.
204.
205.
206.
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interpretations. There still needs to be a push to get multi-stakeholder buy-in in
order for any interpretation to carry normative weight. Therefore, the movement
needs to provide an institutional framework to check and balance platforms’
development of IHRL and place platforms in conversation with other stakeholders.
As discussed above,207 one of the key benefits of IHRL in this context is that
it can provide a common vocabulary for content moderation debates so that even
as rules are contested and “the participants in these debates plainly disagree about
which policies promote the public good[,] . . . there is value to putting them in
conversation with one another.”208 That is, even if, as the proceeding sections have
suggested, the substantive constraints on platforms under IHRL would be minimal,
international law as an argumentative practice has independent value.209 But the
important caveat is that for argumentative practice to be successful, participants
must actually be in conversation. Creating legitimacy and accountability through
argumentative practice requires an institutional structure that facilitates exactly this
kind of argument and contestation. The use of IHRL by platforms, unmoored from
any institutional hierarchy or constraints and not embedded in a broader
conversation, cannot facilitate this process.
There are some proposals for independent or quasi-independent institutions
to check platforms’ application of and compliance with IHRL, such as social media
councils or Facebook’s Oversight Board.210 These proposals are already in train and
most embrace something in this vein.211 These initiatives hold promise,212 but
cannot solve all the concerns raised here. Facebook’s Oversight Board is the most
developed, but as an institution of Facebook’s creation cannot fully cure the lack of
legitimacy and competency in applying IHRL, despite the presence of some IHRL
experts amongst its members. This is especially so if the intention is for platforms
to adopt readings of IHRL that contradict regional bodies’ interpretations of IHRL:
the authority of the Board to demand that Facebook ignore such state-backed
institutions is highly questionable. The multi-stakeholder model of a social media
council including government representatives with democratic mandates may hold
207. See supra Part II(C).
208. Hakimi, supra note 46, at 1304.
209. Id. at 1301.
210. ARTICLE 19, supra note 104; Douek, supra note 31.
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supporting framework); GLOB. PARTNERS DIGIT., A RIGHTS-RESPECTING MODEL OF ONLINE
CONTENT REGULATION BY PLATFORMS 38, 26 (2018), https://www.gp-digital.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/A-rights-respecting-model-of-online-content-regulation-by-platforms.pdf
(proposing an independent Online Platform Standards Oversight Body); TRANSATLANTIC HIGH
LEVEL WORKING GROUP ON CONTENT MODERATION ONLINE AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
FREEDOM AND ACCOUNTABILITY: A TRANSATLANTIC FRAMEWORK FOR MODERATING SPEECH
ONLINE 44, 26–28 (2020), https://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
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more potential in this respect, but its form is still inchoate and its legitimacy in
demanding interpretations that diverge from state-based bodies’ rulings still unclear.
Again, none of this is to diminish the value or importance of these discursive
benefits provided by stakeholders engaged in the project of adapting IHRL to the
work of platforms. Such argumentation and deliberation are inherently valuable as
society adapts to this new information age and muddles through the new challenges
it poses for us. But on the more specific question with which this Article is
concerned—the extent to which IHRL can decide and provide legitimation for
platform policies and decisions in hard cases, especially to those that are prone to
doubt platform bona fides or IHRL in general—it is important to acknowledge that
the offering is more limited.
Accordingly, the argument of this Article has been that there needs to be some
established mechanism for checking and contesting platforms’ use of IHRL that
incorporates state consent and therefore has democratic legitimacy. In the absence
of such a mechanism, platforms’ embrace of IHRL cannot be declared a meaningful
victory. Otherwise, there is a risk of creating a situation where platforms’ use of
IHRL is praised when it aligns with outcomes its advocates like and dismissed when
it differs. This itself could, in the long term, undermine the larger project of creating
an IHRL-based framework for guiding content moderation by suggesting that
participants only favor it when they agree with the outcomes ostensibly issued in its
name.
This possibility has darker potential costs. One of the most important uses of
IHRL for platforms is providing normative backing and legitimation for companies
to push back against government overreach213 in an effort to weather the storm of
rising digital authoritarianism. Allowing companies to deploy IHRL language in
cases where it does little substantive work and is indeterminate, providing little more
than vocabulary for the action companies would take in any event, could weaken its
normative force for when it is really needed: as a bulwark against state oppression.
CONCLUSION
Social media platforms should respect and uphold the rights of their users,
regardless of their status as private profit-maximizing businesses. Their rules and
decisions have profound impacts on individuals and societies, and they should
exercise that power in a public-regarding way and be held accountable for doing so.
This Article should not be read as a call to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
The significant normative force of IHRL can be seen in Facebook’s reliance on it
in challenging a Thai government order to block a private group because it was
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critical of the monarchy,214 or the decision of several major platforms to suspend
government requests for user data in Hong Kong after a new national security law
infringed on freedom of expression and other human rights in the city.215 There are
unfortunately many such examples and no doubt there will be more in the future.
But this context of pushing back against state overreach is very different from a
platform purporting to create new IHRL directly in its own content moderation
decisions.
The proposal for this latter use of IHRL in content moderation has garnered
remarkable momentum and support in an extremely short period of time. This is a
credit to the many strengths of the idea and the important advocacy of those who
have pushed for it. But even as companies start to acknowledge these calls and say
they are adopting advocates’ agenda, we should not be lulled into a false sense of
security. Acknowledging the limitations and complexities of IHRL in content
moderation will ultimately serve to strengthen the long-term endeavor of holding
companies to account for their impact on human rights. If platforms want the
legitimacy dividends associated with respecting IHRL, they should pay for them.
We must demand such payment and create the institutions necessary to ensure that
IHRL in content moderation serves the interests of users and society rather than
being co-opted by platforms to their own ends.
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